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Lawyers Serving as Judges, Prosecutors, and Defense 
Lawyers at the Same Time: Legal Ethics and 
Municipal Courts 
Peter A. Joy
*
 
“We . . . conclude there is an obvious appearance of 
impropriety in regard to attorneys who serve as judges, 
prosecutors, and defense lawyers in the same criminal law 
arena. Consequently, the Center advises a strong position 
against the current practice.”1  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a criminal justice system in which one lawyer is the 
judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney. As far-fetched as it seems, 
such a system exists, not as some imaginary Kafkaesque world, but in 
municipal courts in Missouri and in some other states.
2
 Of course, a 
 
 * Henry Hitchcock Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. I thank 
Karen Tokarz for very helpful comments to an earlier draft of this Article. Portions of this 
Article intersect with and build upon some issues I have explored previously in other contexts. 
See Peter A. Joy, Unequal Assistance of Counsel, 24 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 518 (2015) 
(exploring racial disparities in the justice system including unequal assistance of counsel for 
indigent defendants); Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutorial Conflicts of Interest 
and Excessive Use of Force, 30 CRIM. JUST. 47 (2015) (analyzing prosecutorial conflicts of 
interests). 
 1. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, MISSOURI MUNICIPAL COURTS: BEST PRACTICE 
RECOMMENDATIONS 15 (Nov. 2015), available at http://www.sji.gov/wp/wp-content/ 
uploads/Missouri-Municipal-Court-Best-Practices-Recommendations-Final-Report-2015.pdf 
[hereinafter NCSC, MISSOURI MUNICIPAL COURTS REPORT]. The National Center for State 
Courts (NCSC) prepared this report for the Supreme Court of Missouri and the Office of State 
Court Administrators. Id. The NCSC is an independent nonprofit “targeting the improvement of 
courts nationwide and around the world.” Id. at ii. Its recommendations for Missouri’s 
municipal courts are “based on various best practices operative in limited jurisdiction courts 
throughout the country.” Id. 
 2. See infra notes 4–7 and accompanying text for a description of the intersecting roles 
for lawyers in Missouri’s municipal courts. Other states with similar municipal court systems 
include Ohio and Kansas, which have some municipal courts that employ part-time judges and 
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single lawyer is not in all three roles in the same case, but rather 
holds different roles in different cases in different municipalities— 
often at the same time. In this world of interconnecting roles, Lawyer 
A prosecutes Smith in one city and plea bargains with Lawyer B, 
who is defense counsel representing Smith. In another city, Lawyer A 
is defense counsel representing Jones and Lawyer B is the prosecutor. 
One might suspect that when Lawyer A and Lawyer B get together, 
they trade plea bargains for their respective clients, obtaining better 
outcomes than those defendants unrepresented by lawyers who are 
part of this interconnecting system.
3
 At the same time that Lawyer A 
and Lawyer B may be negotiating with each other on behalf of their 
criminal defendant clients, Lawyer A is sometimes the judge in other 
cases in a third city, Lawyer B is sometimes a judge in yet a fourth 
city, and each may preside over cases in which the other is either 
prosecuting or defending. Confusing? Perhaps the following will help 
to explain this world of interconnected roles, responsibilities, 
loyalties, and most of all, the betrayal of public trust in the fairness of 
municipal courts in some states, such as Missouri. 
A recent news report on municipal courts in St. Louis County, 
Missouri, illustrates multiple role interconnections with a diagram 
consisting of approximately fifty gray lines connecting eighteen 
 
part-time prosecutors, and those part-time judges and part-time prosecutors also may be defense 
lawyers representing clients in other courts. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1901.01 (West  
2013) (listing several municipal courts with part-time judges); David J. Claus, LANGE, DEVINE 
& CLAUS, LLC, http://ldclawoffice.com/david-j-claus/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2016) (listing a 
lawyer’s practice areas and his position as “Part-time Bellevue Municipal Prosecutor” in 
Bellevue, Ohio); Johnson County Municipal Courts, JOHNSON COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.jocobar.org/general/custom.asp?page=13 (last visited Feb. 6, 2016) (listing Karen 
L. Torline as judge in three Kansas municipal courts and prosecutor in one other); Karen L. 
Torline, KUCKELMAN TORLINE KIRKLAND LEWIS, http://www.ktklattorneys.com/ (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2016) (listing Torline’s practice areas including criminal defense); Johnson County 
Juvenile Lawyer, LAW OFFICES OF RANDY R. MCCALLA, http://www.mccallalaw.com/ 
Attorneys/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2016) (stating that in addition to the practice of law Randy 
McCalla “serves as municipal court judge for both the City of Eudora and DeSoto, Kansas”). 
 3. A news report about lawyers in St. Louis County, Missouri, serving multiple roles 
found: “Favors are traded behind the scenes between lawyers who frequently appear before one 
another. The same lawyers are simultaneously charging clients to get the same type of deals.” 
Jennifer S. Mann et al., A Web of Lawyers Play Different Roles in Different Courts, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 29, 2015, 12:15 AM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-
courts/a-web-of-lawyers-play-different-roles-in-different-courts/article_b61728d1-09b0-567f-
9ff4-919cf4e34649.html. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/9
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“lawyers serving as prosecutor or judge in the same court or where 
one of the lawyers was a defense attorney in a court where the other 
was a judge or prosecutor.”4 The diagram also includes an additional 
thirteen red lines connecting fourteen of the lawyers to indicate that 
“they each took a turn as defense attorney in the court where the 
other lawyer served as prosecutor or judge or they serve together as 
prosecutor and judge in one court and in another court one was 
defense attorney and the other was judge or prosecutor.”5 Another 
news report found that thirteen of these lawyers held positions as a 
part-time prosecutor or part-time judge in three or more 
municipalities, and twenty lawyers held such positions in two 
municipalities.
6
 Of the eighty-three municipalities examined in the 
latter news report, sixty-nine municipalities had at least one 
“connection” to another municipality either through “sharing a judge 
or prosecutor . . . or having a judge or prosecutor who works for the 
same law firm as a judge or prosecutor in another municipality.”7 The 
lawyers holding these multiple roles apparently see nothing wrong 
with taking on what appear to be conflicting roles.
8
  
Many of these lawyers also use their positions as part-time 
municipal judges and prosecutors to attract clients seeking their 
services as a defense lawyer. The addendum to a major report about 
municipal courts in St. Louis County contains examples of lawyers 
promoting their multiple roles as judges, prosecutors, and defense 
counsel on their law firm websites.
9
 One example is a lawyer who is 
 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. 
 6. Durrie Bouscaren et al., Overlapping Judges, Prosecutors Weave Tangled Web in St. 
Louis County Municipal Courts, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Mar. 22, 2015), http://news. 
stlpublicradio.org/post/overlapping-judges-prosecutors-weave-tangled-web-st-louis-county-
municipal-courts. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See, e.g., Mann et al., supra note 3 (discussing how lawyers holding multiple roles do 
not see any problems with what they are doing); Bouscaren et al., supra note 6 (providing 
examples of lawyers serving multiple roles who say there is nothing wrong with doing so). 
 9. MO. COUNCIL FOR A BETTER ECON., PUBLIC SAFETY—MUNICIPAL COURTS, JUDGES 
AND PROSECUTORS ADDENDUM app. figs.3 & 5 (Oct. 2014), available at http://www.better 
togetherstl.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/BT-Judges-and-Prosecutors-Report-FINAL1.pdf 
[hereinafter PUBLIC SAFETY—MUNICIPAL COURTS, JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS ADDEMNDUM]. 
The original report is MO. COUNCIL FOR A BETTER ECON., PUBLIC SAFETY—MUNICIPAL 
COURTS (Oct. 2014), available at http://www.bettertogetherstl.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/ 
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the judge in one municipality, is or has been the prosecuting attorney 
in five other municipalities, and lists “Criminal and Traffic Matters” 
as a focus the lawyer’s law practice.10 Another lawyer claims to be “a 
skilled attorney specializing in Criminal Defense, DWI Defense, 
Traffic, Municipal and Family Law”11 and then lists his positions as 
judge in two municipalities and prosecutor for three other cities.
12
 A 
third example is a lawyer stating that he has “handled numerous 
criminal and traffic cases,” who serves as the prosecuting attorney in 
three cities, is the deputy prosecutor in an additional city, and is the 
judge in another.
13
  
The system of lawyers serving multiple roles as judge, prosecutor, 
and defense lawyer raises the appearance of impropriety and potential 
conflict of interest issues under the ethics rules for judges.
14
 Lawyers 
serving in these multiple roles also implicates possible conflict of 
interest issues under the ethics rules for lawyers.
15
 The system of 
overlapping roles also raises questions of fundamental fairness. Do 
clients of lawyers with these overlapping roles get better plea 
bargains than those who are not their clients? Will a prosecutor 
zealously represent a city’s interests when the defense lawyer is a 
presiding judge in another city where the prosecutor appears 
frequently in the role of defense lawyer? Can a defense lawyer who is 
combative with a prosecutor in one city receive a fair consideration 
for another client from the prosecutor in his role as a judge in a 
second city?
16
 More importantly, are those individuals too poor to 
 
10/BT-Municipal-Courts-Report-Full-Report1.pdf [hereinafter PUBLIC SAFETY—MUNICIPAL 
COURTS]. 
 10. PUBLIC SAFETY—MUNICIPAL COURTS, JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS ADDENDUM, 
supra note 9, app. fig.3. 
 11. Id. app. fig.4. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. app. fig.5. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See infra Part IV. There has been little scholarship about part-time prosecutors, and 
the only substantial work on the subject gives only a brief mention to lawyers serving as part-
time municipal prosecutors. See Richard H. Underwood, Part-Time Prosecutors and Conflicts 
of Interest: A Survey and Some Proposals, 81 KY. L.J. 1, 41–42 (1992–93).  
 16. A variation of this scenario is recounted in a news article quoting a lawyer who was 
combative with a county prosecutor in one case where the same prosecutor was the judge in a 
municipal court where the defense lawyer represented another client. Radley Balko, How 
Municipalities in St. Louis County, Mo., Profit from Poverty, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2014), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/9
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afford any lawyer—and especially too poor to retain a defense lawyer 
who is also a prosecutor and/or judge—treated more harshly in 
municipal courts throughout St. Louis County? 
I explore these questions in light of both the underlying factual 
background of municipal court operations in St. Louis County and 
the relevant ethics rules for judges and lawyers, both serving as a 
prosecutor or defense attorney. The focus is on Missouri, and St. 
Louis County especially, where substantial attention has been 
directed toward the operation of municipal courts.
17
 Although it is 
beyond the scope of this Article to investigate every such jurisdiction 
with similar municipal court issues, the analysis and 
recommendations are applicable to any jurisdiction that permits 
practices such as those in Missouri, where municipalities have part-
time judges and prosecutors who also serve as defense lawyers in 
other municipal courts even within the same county. My focus is on 
the legal ethics implications. I confine my recommendations to what 
the judiciary can do to address these issues, given that the highest 
court in each state has the authority to regulate municipal courts
18
 and 
the legal profession.
19
  
I begin in Part II by exploring the context in which the same 
lawyers serve multiple roles by examining how the municipal courts 
in St. Louis County operate. Next, I analyze the ethics of part-time 
municipal court judges simultaneously serving as prosecutors and 
defense lawyers in other courts in the same county in Part III. I 
conclude Part III with a call for the Supreme Court of Missouri to 
amend the judicial ethics rules to prohibit a lawyer serving as a judge 
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/09/03/how-st-louis-county-missouri-
profits-from-poverty/. 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. Article V, § 5 of the Missouri Constitution empowers the Supreme Court of Missouri 
to “establish rules relating to practice, procedure and pleading for all courts and administrative 
tribunals, which shall have the force and effect of law.” MO. CONST. art. V, § 5.  
 19. “[T]hirteen state constitutions expressly grant the judiciary authority to regulate 
lawyers [and] . . . state high courts opinions [are] unanimous that regulation of lawyers in an 
inherent judicial function.” ABA COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, 
LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY (1992), available at http://www.american 
bar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/report_archive/mckay_report.html. There 
are other possible ways to reform the municipal court system in Missouri or elsewhere through 
legislative action, but I focus on changes to the ethics rules regulating judges and lawyers, 
which are the domain of the highest court in each state. See infra Parts III.B, IV.B. 
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in a municipal court from serving as either a prosecutor or defense 
lawyer in any other court in the same county. In Part IV, I analyze the 
ethics of lawyers serving as both prosecutors and defense lawyers in 
municipal courts in the same county even if they do not also serve as 
judges. I conclude Part IV with alternative measures that the Supreme 
Court of Missouri could adopt to prohibit a lawyer serving as a 
prosecutor in a municipal court from serving as a defense lawyer in 
any other court in the same county. Although these recommendations 
are directed to the Supreme Court of Missouri, they are appropriate 
for other state high courts across the country to consider if their 
current ethics rules permit lawyers to have multiple roles in different 
municipal (sometimes referred to as limited jurisdiction) courts in the 
same county. 
II. MUNICIPAL COURTS IN CONTEXT 
In order to explore questions of possible conflicts of interest for 
municipal prosecutors and judges serving multiple roles, as well as 
the possible appearance of impropriety for such arrangements, it is 
important to look at the arrangements concretely and not just 
theoretically. To do so, I focus on municipal courts in St. Louis 
County to illustrate the ethical pitfalls for lawyers simultaneously 
serving multiple roles in the criminal justice system. This part 
provides a brief overview of the underlying concerns of many 
concerning the fairness of the municipal courts in St. Louis County 
when the same lawyer may be a judge, prosecutor, and defense 
lawyer in different municipal courts at the same time.  
In the aftermath of the death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, 
Missouri, which is located in St. Louis County, the public protests put 
a spotlight on St. Louis County. Both police practices and the 
practices of municipal courts were a focus of protests.
20
 In a response 
 
 20. See, e.g., Megan Davies & Dan Burns, In Riot-Hit Ferguson, Traffic Fines Boost 
Tension and Budget, REUTERS NEWS (Aug. 19, 2014, 7:44 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-usa-missouri-shooting-tickets-insight-idUSKBN0GJ2CB20140819 (reporting that 
heavy reliance on traffic fines as revenue source has inflamed racial tensions); Emily Thomas, 
Ferguson Averages 3 Warrants Per Household, News Report Shows, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 
22, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/22/ferguson-warrants-per-household_n_ 
5698454.html (stating that a report suggests that police and municipal courts in St. Louis 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/9
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to unrest around Michael Brown’s death and protests about 
underlying social and economic conditions, Governor Jay Nixon 
appointed the Ferguson Commission, an independent group, to 
conduct a “thorough, wide-ranging and unflinching study of the 
social and economic conditions that impede progress, equality and 
safety in the St. Louis region.”21 The Ferguson Commission’s work 
included an investigation into the operations of the municipal court 
system, which was increasingly drawing public attention, and 
recommendations for needed reforms.
22
 
Preceding the Ferguson Commission’s recommendations were a 
report on municipal courts in St. Louis County by the ArchCity 
Defenders
23
 and the findings of the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
investigation into the police department and municipal court in 
Ferguson.
24
 Both the ArchCity Defenders and the DOJ found 
municipal court practices that disparately affected African 
Americans. 
The ArchCity Defenders’ Municipal Courts White Paper, released 
the same month as Michael Brown’s shooting, is based on 
observations at sixty different municipal courts in St. Louis County 
and sworn statements from clients and others during the 
investigation.
25
 In approximately half of the courts studied, the 
 
County target African Americans); Balko, supra note 16 (reporting that protests in Ferguson are 
partly a reaction to unfair policing and municipal court practices).  
 21. FERGUSON COMM’N, FORWARD THROUGH FERGUSON: A PATH TOWARD RACIAL 
EQUITY 14 (Oct. 4, 2015), available at http://3680or2khmk3bzkp33juiea1.wpengine.netdna-
cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/101415_FergusonCommissionReport.pdf.  
 22. The Ferguson Commission suggests several areas of reform, including reforms to the 
municipal court system and calls for action to address perceived conflicts of interest with 
lawyers serving simultaneously serving as municipal judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers. 
See id. at 31–36; supra note 20. 
 23. The ArchCity Defenders is a nonprofit providing holistic criminal and civil legal 
services to the homeless and working poor in the St. Louis metropolitan area. Our Mission & 
Story, ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, http://www.archcitydefenders.org/who-we-are/our-mission-
story/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).  
 24. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 4–5 (Mar. 4, 2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [hereinafter 
DOJ FERGUSON REPORT]. 
 25. ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, MUNICIPAL COURTS WHITE PAPER 2 (2014), available at 
http://03a5010.netsolhost.com/WordPress/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/ArchCity-Defenders-
Municipal-Courts-Whitepaper.pdf. 
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ArchCity Defenders found that the poor and minorities were 
disproportionately jailed for their inability to pay fines, refused 
access to the courts if they were with children or family, or 
mistreated by court personnel, prosecutors, and judges.
26
  
The DOJ found that the Ferguson Police Department both 
disproportionately targeted African Americans for traffic stops and 
searches and disproportionately used force against them.
27
 From 
2012–2014, 85 percent of persons subject to vehicle stops were 
African American, as were 90 percent of those receiving citations and 
93 percent of those arrested, while only 67 percent of the population 
in Ferguson was African American.
28
 After controlling for non-race 
based variables such as the reason police initiated vehicle stops, data 
from this same two-year period show that police searched African 
Americans at twice the rate of white drivers, even though African 
Americans were “found in possession of contraband 26% less often 
than white drivers, suggesting officers are impermissibly considering 
race as a factor when determining whether to search.”29 Police 
charged some offenses, such as “Manner of Walking in Roadway” 
and “Failure to Comply,” almost exclusively against African 
Americans.
30
 The DOJ report demonstrates that this pattern of 
targeting African Americans is also present in the police use of force, 
where “90% of documented force used by the FPD officers was used 
against African Americans.”31 
The DOJ additionally found that the practice of the Ferguson 
Municipal Court, which operates on a part-time basis with a part-time 
judge, prosecutor, and city attorney, disproportionately harms African 
Americans. Among other practices, the municipal court judge, in 
exercising discretion, was 68 percent less likely to dismiss a case and 
50 percent more likely to issue an arrest warrant when the defendant 
 
 26. Id. at 1–3. 
 27. DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 24, at 4–5.  
 28. Id. at 4. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. (“For example, from 2011 to 2013, African Americans accounted for [95 percent] 
of Manner of Walking in Roadway charges, and [94 percent] of all Failure to Comply 
Charges.”). 
 31. Id. at 5. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/9
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was African American.
32
 Further, African Americans accounted for 
92 percent of cases in which arrest warrants were issued.
33
 Of those 
arrested for outstanding municipal court warrants, 96 percent were 
African American.
34
 
The DOJ investigation determined that the disparate impact of 
police and municipal court practices on African Americans could not 
be explained by the difference in crime rates by people of different 
races, but rather was due in part to an “unlawful bias against and 
stereotypes about African Americans.”35 Evidence of racial bias 
included emails circulated by Ferguson officials, including police 
supervisors and court supervisors, which stereotyped racial minorities 
as lazy,
36
 unable to hold a steady job,
37
 and as criminals.
38
 
The DOJ report also uncovered instances of both the municipal 
judge and prosecutor in Ferguson using their positions to help 
themselves or others. In one instance, the judge in Ferguson, who 
also served as the judge in another municipality, said he would take 
care of a speeding ticket issued to a Ferguson Police Department 
patrol supervisor.
39
 In another instance, the same judge asked the 
prosecutor in Ferguson, who was also a prosecutor in another city, to 
dismiss a red light camera ticket the judge had received in the other 
city, and the prosecutor did so.
40
 The DOJ only looked at the 
operation of the municipal court in Ferguson and not at other local 
municipal courts, and the extent to which favors were or are traded 
among other municipal court prosecutors and judges is unclear. Still, 
the instances in Ferguson that involved other municipalities suggest 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 72 (“A June 2011 email described a man seeking to obtain ‘welfare’ for his dogs 
because they are ‘mixed in color, unemployed, lazy, can’t speak English and have no frigging 
clue who their Daddies are.’”). 
 37. Id. (“A November 2008 email stated that President Barack Obama would not be 
President for very long because ‘what black man holds a steady job for four years.’”). 
 38. Id. (“A May 2011 email stated: ‘An African-American woman in New Orleans was 
admitted into the hospital for a pregnancy termination. Two weeks later she received a check 
for $5,000. She phoned the hospital to ask who it was from. The hospital said, 
Crimestoppers.’”). 
 39. Id. at 74. 
 40. Id.  
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that this is widespread, and lawyers familiar with municipal court 
practices in St. Louis County claim that such favors are routinely 
traded among lawyers serving multiple roles as part-time judges, 
prosecutors, and defense lawyers.
41
 
Compounding concerns over the disparate impact of the municipal 
court system on persons of color and the poor, and the multiple roles 
some lawyers play within the municipal court system, is the 
municipalities’ dependence on court fines and fees to their operating 
budgets.
42
 In 2013, Missouri municipal courts collected $132,032,352 
in court fines and fees; the ninety municipalities in St. Louis County 
accounted for $45,136,416, or 34 percent of the statewide total, 
notwithstanding that only 11 percent of the population of Missouri 
resides in those municipalities.
43
 For comparison, St. Louis City has 5 
percent of the population for Missouri and collected 7 percent of the 
statewide fines and fees in 2013, and the unincorporated areas of St. 
Louis County have approximately 5 percent of the population of 
Missouri and accounted for 5 percent of municipal fines and fees in 
Missouri in 2013.
44
 The municipalities in St. Louis County most 
heavily dependent on fines and fees are, on average, predominantly 
African American with over one in five citizens living in poverty.
45
 
A report sponsored by the Missouri Council for a Better Economy 
(also known as St. Louis Better Together) notes that while state law 
prohibits compensating a municipal judge or prosecutor based in any 
way on caseload or fines, the fact that each municipality hires its own 
judge and prosecutor, and pays them directly from municipal 
 
 41. See Mann et al., supra note 3. 
 42. See, e.g., Balko, supra note 16 (“Some of the towns in St. Louis County can derive 40 
percent or more of their annual revenue from petty fines and fees collected by their municipal 
courts.”); Mike Maciag, Skyrocketing Court Fines Are Major Revenue Generator for Ferguson, 
GOVERNING (Aug. 22, 2014) http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-
ferguson-missouri-court-fines-budget.html (“A review of Ferguson’s financial statement 
indicates that court fine collections now account for one-fifth of total operating revenue.”).  
 43. PUBLIC SAFETY—MUNICIPAL COURTS, supra note 9, at 2.  
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. ([“Municipalities’ whose largest individual source of revenue is municipal fines 
and fees] populations were on average 62% black, with 22% of their citizens living below the 
poverty line. In comparison, St. Louis county as a whole is 24% black with 11% of its 
population below the poverty line.”). 
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revenues, “contributes to distrust in a system.”46 The report continues 
that such a system “perpetuates some citizens’ perception that certain 
courts exist not to ensure justice and safety, but rather as revenue 
generators for struggling municipalities. Ultimately, it calls into 
question the overall integrity of these courts and unduly strains the 
trust of citizens in their local governments.”47  
The DOJ report on the municipal court in Ferguson produced 
evidence suggesting that concerns that municipal courts are 
principally focused on revenue generation, rather than ensuring 
justice, are well-founded. In a 2011 report to the Ferguson City 
Council, the Finance Director noted that during the municipal judge’s 
tenure he “ha[d] been successful in significantly increasing court 
collections over the years.”48 The report included a list, which the 
judge drew up, highlighting additional fees that the judge stated were 
“what he has done to help in the areas of court efficiency and 
revenue.”49 The DOJ noted that many of the fees “are widely 
considered abusive and may be unlawful, including several that the 
City has repealed during the pendency of our investigation.”50 At one 
point during his tenure, the municipal judge complained about a new 
municipal prosecutor recommending fines that “were not high 
enough.”51 In discussing the judge’s performance, one Ferguson City 
Councilmember objected to the judge’s reappointment, noting that 
the judge “does not listen to testimony, does not review the reports or 
the criminal history of defendants, and doesn’t let all the pertinent 
witnesses testify before rendering a verdict.”52 The City Manager 
urged the judge’s reappointment stating that “[i]t goes without saying 
 
 46. PUBLIC SAFETY—MUNICIPAL COURTS, supra note 9, at 1. One Missouri law provides: 
“The salaries of the judges . . . shall be paid by the municipality.” MO. REV. STAT. § 479.060.1 
(2015). Another Missouri law similarly states: “The salary or fees of the [prosecuting] attorney 
and his necessary expenses incurred in such prosecutions shall be paid by the municipality.” Id. 
§ 479.120.  
 47. PUBLIC SAFETY—MUNICIPAL COURTS, supra note 9, at 1.  
 48. DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 24, at 14.  
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 15. 
 52. Id. 
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the City cannot afford to lose any efficiency in our Courts, nor 
experience any decrease in our Fines and Forfeitures.”53 
The municipal courts’ emphasis on revenue generation is also 
reflected in a 2004 survey of municipal court employees in Missouri. 
Only a combined 34 percent disagreed or disagreed strongly with the 
statement that: “It is the responsibility of the courts to raise revenue 
for cities through fines and fees.”54 At the same time, a combined 31 
percent agreed or agreed strongly that the purpose of municipal 
courts is to raise revenue, while 33 percent neither agreed nor 
disagreed with the statement.
55
  
The National Center for State Courts (NCSC) report, “Missouri 
Municipal Courts: Best Practice Recommendations,” prepared for the 
Supreme Court of Missouri and the Office of State Court 
Administrators and released in November 2015, expresses strong 
concerns about the need for municipal courts in Missouri to function 
independently with clearly defined powers.
56
 “[I]t is the National 
Center’s opinion that there is a greater tendency that the judge’s 
independence may be threatened or compromised through a fear of 
losing his or her job by displeasing city officials through rulings 
against the city or a reluctance to generate higher levels of revenue 
from fines and fees.”57 The report also asserts that it is critical for the 
municipal courts to “visibly function as part of the judicial branch” 
with municipal court operations clearly distinguishable from city 
functions.
58
 “In many municipal courts, employees, and tragically, 
some municipal judges, are confused about their overall attachment 
to the State Judicial Branch.”59 And, the report takes a very tough 
stance on the need for the adoption of formal conflict of interest rules 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Lawrence G. Myers, Judicial Independence in the Municipal Court: Preliminary 
Observations from Missouri, 41 COURT REV. 26, 30 fig.7 (2004). Thirteen percent strongly 
disagreed and twenty-three percent disagreed with the statement that the purpose of municipal 
courts is to raise revenue. Id. at 30 fig.6. Thirty-three percent neither agreed nor disagreed with 
the statement. Id. 
 55. Ten percent strongly agreed and twenty-one percent agreed with the statement that the 
purpose of municipal courts is to raise revenue. Id.  
 56. NCSC, MISSOURI MUNICIPAL COURTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 3–4 and 
accompanying recommendations.  
 57. Id. at 3–4  
 58. Id. at 4–6 and accompanying recommendations. 
 59. Id. at 5. 
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for municipal judges, because part-time judges serving in other roles 
may affect their ability to be impartial.
60
  
The same lawyers serving as judges, prosecutors, and defense 
lawyers, with overlapping and blurred roles and responsibilities, 
combined with municipalities that are dependent on fines and court 
costs and that view municipal judges as revenue generators for the 
municipality, are conditions that breed public distrust in the 
municipal courts. The following part of this Article examines the 
judicial ethics implications of such a court system. 
III. JUDICIAL ETHICS IN MUNICIPAL COURTS 
A. Problem 
Does a judge in one city who is simultaneously a prosecutor in a 
second city and a defense lawyer in a third city live up to the rules of 
judicial ethics? Does it matter if the judge presides over cases 
involving prosecutors and defense lawyers who, in turn, are judges 
and prosecutors in the cities in which the judge appears as a 
prosecutor or defense lawyer? These types of arrangements, which 
currently exist in Missouri and some other states, are implicitly 
prohibited by existing ethics rules and explicitly prohibited in some 
other jurisdictions.
61
 As this part explains, I conclude that the 
Supreme Court of Missouri should follow the examples set by 
jurisdictions that explicitly prohibit part-time judges from also 
serving as prosecutor or defense lawyer in the same county in which 
they are judges. 
The American Bar Association (ABA) Code of Judicial Conduct 
are the prototypical ethics rules by which judges should conduct 
themselves.
62
 Using the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct as a model, 
 
 60. Id. at 15. The report calls for strong, formal conflict of interest rules. See id. at 14–15 
and accompanying recommendations. The NCSC recommendation and rationale for strong 
conflict of interest rules are discussed infra notes 107–11 and accompanying text.  
 61. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 62. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2011). The ABA House of Delegates adopted 
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct in 1990, and amended it in 1997, 1999, 2003, 2007, and 
2010. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (Dec. 12, 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_code_of_judicial_conduct.html. The 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct succeeded the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics. Judicial Ethics 
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the Supreme Court of Missouri in 1998 adopted the Missouri Code of 
Judicial Conduct,
63
 which tracks the ABA Code. 
Rule 2-3.1 of Missouri Code of Judicial Conduct explicitly states: 
“A judge shall not practice law.”64 There are limited exceptions 
stating that a judge “may represent himself or herself and may, 
without compensation, give legal advice to and draft or review 
documents for a member of the judge’s family, but is prohibited from 
serving as the family member’s lawyer in any forum.”65 A comment 
to the prohibition on law practice provides insight to the underlying 
rationale by stating: “A judge must not use the prestige of office to 
advance the judge’s personal or family interests. See Rule 2-1.3”66 
Rule 2-1.3 states that it is an abuse of the prestige of judicial office 
“to advance the person or economic interests of the judge or others, 
or allow other to do so.”67  
In spite of these rules highlighting the rationale that a judge who 
holds him or herself out as available to practice law would be using 
the prestige of judicial office to advance personal interests, the 
Missouri Code of Judicial Conduct largely excludes part-time 
municipal judges from the prohibition on the practice of law.
68
 It 
 
& Regulation, ABA (Dec. 12, 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_ 
responsibility/resources/judicial_ethics_regulation.html. 
 63. MO. SUP. CT. R. 2, ed. nts. (2012) [hereinafter MO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT]. The 
Supreme Court of Missouri adopted the Code of Judicial Conduct in 1998, and amended it in 
2011. Id. Prior to adopting the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Supreme Court of Missouri had 
adopted Canons of Judicial Ethics in 1966. Id.  
 64. Id. at R. 2-3.10.  
 65. Id. A comment to the rule provides for an additional exception stating: “A judge may 
practice law as part of his or her military service.” Id. at R. 2-3.10, cmt. [1].  
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at R. 2-1.3. 
 68. It states: 
III. PART-TIME MUNICIPAL JUDGE 
A judge, other than a Senior Judge, who serves on a part-time basis as a municipal 
judge by election or appointment, shall comply with all provisions of this code:  
(A) except:  
 (1) Rules 2-3.2 to 2-3.15 and Rules 2-4.1 to 2-4.2; and  
  (2) Rule 2-2.10 (Judicial Statements on Pending and Impending Cases), while not 
serving as a judge;  
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states that a part-time municipal judge does not have to comply with 
the prohibition on the practice of law except in the municipal court 
where the judge serves, in a matter that could be brought in the 
municipal court where the judge serves, or in a matter where the 
judge has presided over any part of the proceedings.
69
 By permitting 
part-time municipal judges to practice law, especially without 
restrictions on a part-time judges also practicing law in other courts 
in the county as prosecutors or defense lawyers, the current Code of 
Municipal Conduct creates a framework within which a part-time 
judge may believe that he or she could use the prestige of judicial 
office to attract clients and perhaps enhance bargaining power as a 
prosecutor or defense lawyer. Still, other provisions in the Missouri 
Code of Judicial Conduct imply that this is not permitted. 
The Preamble to the Missouri Code of Judicial Conduct begins by 
stressing that judges must be independent, fair, and impartial in order 
to preserve justice and the rule of law.
70
 The Preamble continues that 
 
(B) but shall not: 
 (1) practice law in the municipal division of the circuit court on which the judge 
serves; 
 (2) act as a lawyer in any matter wherein any underlying facts occurred within the 
geographic boundaries of the political subdivision for which the judge serves and 
which matter could be brought by a proceeding in the municipal division of the circuit 
court in which the judge serves; or, 
 (3) act as a lawyer in a proceeding in which the judge has served as a judge or in any 
other proceeding related thereto. 
Id. at R. 2, Application, III. 
 69. Id. 
 70. The Preamble begins by stating: 
[1] An independent, fair and impartial judiciary is indispensable to our system of 
justice. The United States legal system is based upon the principle that an independent, 
impartial, and competent judiciary, composed of men and women of integrity, will 
interpret and apply the law that governs our society. Thus, the judiciary plays a central 
role in preserving the principles of justice and the rule of law. Inherent in all the Rules 
contained in this code are the precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must 
respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to maintain and 
enhance confidence in the legal system.  
[2] Judges should maintain the dignity of judicial office at all times, and avoid both 
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in their professional and personal lives. 
They should aspire at all times to conduct that ensures the greatest possible public 
confidence in their independence, impartiality, integrity, and competence.  
Id. at R. 2.00, Preamble (emphasis added). 
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in order to maintain the dignity of judicial office a judge should at all 
times, “avoid both impropriety and the appearance of impropriety” in 
their professional and personal lives, and “should aspire to conduct 
that ensures the greatest possible public confidence in their 
independence, impartiality, integrity, and competence.”71  
The emphasis on the need for the judiciary to avoid both 
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety is echoed in Canon 1, 
which states: “A judge shall uphold and promote the independence, 
integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid 
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”72 A comment 
explains: “The test for appearance of impropriety is whether the 
conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the 
judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, 
impartiality, and appropriate temperament is impaired.”73 As a result, 
the prevailing view is that judicial behavior should be evaluated from 
the perspective of how the judge’s conduct appears to an objectively 
reasonable person.
74
 Another comment notes that “it is not 
practicable to list all such conduct” that “compromises or appears to 
compromise the independence, integrity, and impartiality of a judge 
[and] undermines public confidence in the judiciary.”75 Thus, the 
Missouri Code of Judicial Conduct contemplates a wide range of 
prohibited conduct not expressly enumerated. 
Regarding conflicts of interest, Canon 2 simply states: “A judge 
shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially, competently, 
 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at R. 2-1.2.  
 73. Id. at R. 2-1.2, cmt. [5].  
 74. Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court surveyed state and federal courts and noted 
that a majority of these courts use an objectively reasonable standard in determining whether 
there is impropriety or appearance of impropriety, and held that an appearance of impropriety is 
present “where there is a reasonable basis to doubt a judge’s behavior.” In re Reddin, 111 A.3d 
74, 82 (N.J. 2015); see also Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 822 P.2d 1333, 1340 (Alaska 1991) 
(stating that the appropriate test is “whether petitioner [judge] failed to use reasonable care to 
prevent a reasonably objective individual from believing that an impropriety was afoot”); In re 
K.L.W., 131 S.W.3d 400, 405 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the test for recusal is whether 
there is a factual basis for a reasonable person “to find an appearance of impropriety and 
thereby doubt the impartiality of the court”). 
 75. MO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2-1.2, cmt. [3] (2012). 
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and diligently.”76 Rule 2-2.11 specifies certain instances when a 
judge must recuse him or herself,
77
 but in other instances relies on the 
judge’s own discretion to determine when “the judge’s impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned.”78 
Unfortunately, the standards for and types of impropriety, 
appearance of impropriety, and conflicts of interest that are not 
 
 76. Id. at R. 2, Canon 2. Rules 2-2.2–2-2.4 discuss a judge’s duties to be impartial and 
fair, to perform judicial duties without bias, prejudice or engage in harassment, and to not 
permit external influences on judicial conduct. Id. at R. 2-2.2–2-2.4. 
 77. Rule 2-2.11 states that a judge must recuse himself or herself when any of the 
following circumstances are present: 
(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer or 
knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding that would preclude the judge 
from being fair and impartial.  
(2) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge’s 
spouse, parent, or child wherever residing, or any other member of the judge’s family 
residing in the judge’s household is:  
 (a) a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, general partner, managing 
member, or trustee of a party; 
 (b) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;  
 (c) a person who has more than a de minimis interest that could be substantially 
affected by the proceeding; or  
 (d) likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.  
(3) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge’s 
spouse, parent or child wherever residing, or any other member of the judge’s family 
residing in the judge’s household, has an economic interest in the subject matter in 
controversy or in a party to the proceeding.  
(4) The judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate, has made a public statement, other 
than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that commits or appears to 
commit the judge to reach a particular result or rule in a particular way in the 
proceeding or controversy.  
(5) The judge:  
 (a) served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or was associated with a lawyer 
who participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such association;  
 (b) served in governmental employment, and in such capacity participated 
personally and substantially as a lawyer or public official concerning the proceeding, 
or has publicly expressed in such capacity an opinion concerning the merits of the 
particular matter in controversy;  
 (c) was a material witness concerning the matter.  
Id. at R. 2-2.11. 
 78. Rule 2-2.11 states: “A judge shall recuse himself or herself in any proceeding in 
which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . .” Id. 
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enumerated are not clearly defined by the judicial ethics rules. The 
judicial ethics rules presume that each individual judge will self-
monitor his or her own behavior. This lack of clarity creates the 
ethical grey zone in which lawyers serving as part-time municipal 
judges have at times shown a lack of self-restraint in how they use 
their judicial offices. The absence of clear definitions for impropriety 
and conflicts of interest also likely contribute to some judges far 
exceeding the bounds of what is appropriate, thereby engaging in 
improper conduct or at least creating an appearance of impropriety 
triggering their discipline. 
Judges have been disciplined for using their judicial office either 
to advance personal interests or where their actions suggest that they 
may be attempting to advance personal interests. For example, the 
State Commission on Judicial Conduct and the New York Court of 
Appeals, the State’s highest court, found that a lawyer serving as a 
village judge created an appearance of impropriety when he made a 
statement to an attorney implying that he would use his judicial office 
to advance his personal interests in deciding a motion.
79
 The New 
York Court of Appeals stated that whether he actually decided the 
motion on the merits was “largely irrelevant to the charge, because 
the harm inured when he indicated that he would use his judicial 
powers to satisfy a personal vendetta, a classic instance in which ‘an 
appearance of such impropriety is no less to be condemned than is the 
impropriety itself.’”80 The Court removed the lawyer from his 
position as village judge for this violation and for two other 
violations: making inappropriate and derogatory remarks about ethnic 
and racial groups, and failing to maintain adequate records in 
criminal cases.
81
 
 
 79. In re Shiff, 635 N.E.2d 286, 288 (N.Y. 1994). A village judge implied that he would 
rule against a party represented by a law firm where one of the partners was also a local town 
judge who had dismissed traffic charges against driver who had been in a traffic accident with 
the village judge. Id. at 287–88. The court stated: “Petitioner created the impression that he was 
using his judicial office to retaliate, and thus failed to avoid the appearance of impropriety and 
to conduct himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the impartiality and integrity 
of the judiciary.” Id. at 288.  
 80. Id. (quoting Matter of Spector v. State Comm’n. on Judicial Conduct, 392 N.E.2d 552 
(N.Y. 1979)).  
 81. Id. at 287–88. 
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In another case, a committee on judicial conduct recommended to 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court that a district court judge be 
disciplined for telephoning a police officer, whom the judge knew 
personally, a short time after the officer had issued a summons for 
speeding to the judge’s brother.82 The committee found that officer 
told the judge that “he would feel more comfortable if Judge Snow’s 
brother would come down to the station and bring the summons and 
that they could then take care of it.”83 The committee also found that 
although the judge told the officer “that he wasn’t calling to fix the 
ticket,” the judge informed his brother to take the summons to the 
police station where all copies were destroyed and the ticket was 
voided.
84
 The court concurred with the committee’s finding that 
“[e]ven the appearance that Judge Snow intervened to obtain 
favorable treatment from the police for his brother plainly 
undermines public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 
judiciary.”85 The court also agreed with the committee’s finding that 
the judge “should have known that his actions would create the 
appearance of impropriety.”86 The court issued a public censure, 
suspended the judge for a period of six months without pay, and 
required the judge to complete successfully a course in judicial 
ethics.
87
 
Despite such examples of the misuse of judicial office, some 
municipal judges in Missouri and elsewhere have shown a lack of 
self-restraint by assuming that there is nothing improper in 
simultaneously serving as prosecutor, defense lawyer, and judge in 
other municipal courts. The extent to which some may trade upon 
their judicial office either to be vindictive, as did the village judge in 
New York, or possibly to wield influence to benefit others, as did the 
district judge in New Hampshire, we do not know. According to the 
DOJ report, there is at least some evidence of this occurring in the 
Ferguson Municipal Court.
88
 There is also evidence from the DOJ 
 
 82. In re Snow’s Case, 674 A.2d 573, 574–75 (N.H. 1996). 
 83. Id. at 575. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 578. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 579–80. 
 88. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 24, at 74–75.   
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report that at least one judge also saw his job as to generate revenue 
for the city,
89
 and certainly many involved in the municipal court 
system see this as an objective of the municipal courts.
90
 
As the large number of part-time judges serving as defense 
lawyers also illustrates,
91
 few if any of these judges are concerned 
with how it looks to the public and whether it may interfere with their 
judicial role. Their reasoning is simple—if there is not an express rule 
prohibiting their actions, it must be permissible. This reasoning may 
explain how the municipal judge in Chesterfield, Missouri, 
represented a defendant in a DUI case in Town and Country, 
Missouri, as the defendant drove from Town and Country into 
Chesterfield.
92
 The defendant was arrested by a Town and Country 
police officer in Chesterfield, where the defendant’s lawyer is a 
judge.
93
 Even in such an extreme case where the defendant could 
have been charged in Chesterfield,
94
 the municipal judge from 
Chesterfield went to Town and Country to defend him. The judge 
would not respond to calls from the press to explain how he justified 
taking on the case, but the prosecutor from Chesterfield, who also 
serves as a defense lawyer in other municipalities, stated that he saw 
nothing wrong with the judge taking on a role that seemed in conflict 
and that, in his view, it was acceptable to take on different roles in 
different cases.
95
 
The resulting system of municipal courts with part-time judges 
who also engage in private practice operates with a patina of 
unrealistic expectations. Many lawyers hired as municipal judges 
cannot resist the possible rewards they may reap by also being a 
 
 89. See id. at 14–15; see also PUBLIC SAFETY—MUNICIPAL COURTS, supra note 9, at 1. 
 90. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
 91. See Mann et al., supra note 3; see also Bouscaren et al., supra note 6. 
 92. Jeremy Kohler & Stephen Deere, Municipal Mercenaries Often Thrive Off of 
Contrary Roles, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 28, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.stltoday. 
com/news/local/crime-and-courts/municipal-mercenaries-often-thrive-off-of-contrary-roles/ 
article_46094377-d311-53ee-9776-7110e98fd03f.html. 
 93. John Hoffman, the publisher of a newsletter focusing on municipal court cases in west 
St. Louis County, stated that the defendant “could have been charged in Chesterfield.” Id. In my 
experience, it would usually require the arresting officer to be a Chesterfield police officer for 
charges to be brought in Chesterfield.  
 94. Hoffman stated: “He was driving drunk in Chesterfield. He was violating 
Chesterfield’s ordinance . . . . It’s not right.” Id. 
 95. Id. See infra note 141 for the Chesterfield prosecutor’s explanation. 
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prosecutor and defense lawyer in other municipal courts. While the 
extent of the rewards from generating business due to their multiple 
roles is unclear, there are examples that some lawyers serving as a 
municipal judge promoting their multiple roles on their firm websites, 
presumably to attract new clients.
96
 It is also unclear to what extent 
those municipal judges who also serve as defense lawyers and 
prosecutors in other municipal courts obtain better outcomes for 
clients in exchange for giving better outcomes to the other lawyers 
who are also judges and prosecutors, but the DOJ Ferguson Report 
indicates that dismissing tickets for others and having one’s own 
tickets dismissed are some of the advantages.
97
  
Another unrealistic expectation is that a municipality, which is 
dependent on court fines and fees, will not pressure its judge to focus 
on generating fines and fees, rather administrate justice. As the DOJ 
report on the municipal court in Ferguson and a prior survey of 
municipal court employees demonstrate, just the opposite can 
occur.
98
 The DOJ report also suggests that it is unrealistic to expect 
that a lawyer who is hired as a municipal judge will resist such 
pressure.
99
 The fact that such a system is permitted to operate in a 
way that it generates such questions should, at least, fit a reasonable 
person’s definition of the “appearance of impropriety.” 
These concerns led the NCSC to “conclude there is an obvious 
appearance of impropriety in regard to attorneys who serve as judges, 
prosecutors, and defense lawyers in the same criminal law arena. 
Consequently, the Center advises a strong position against the current 
practice.”100 The NCSC reached this conclusion through observations 
and interviews indicating some of the lawyers serving as both part-
time municipal judges and prosecutors where ethically challenged by 
serving in multiple roles.
101
 
The Missouri Code of Judicial Conduct places an emphasis both 
on the integrity of the judiciary by prohibiting “impropriety” and on 
 
 96. See PUBLIC SAFETY—MUNICIPAL COURTS, supra note 9.  
 97. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 24, at 74–75.  
 98. See id. at 14–15; see also Myers, supra note 54.  
 99. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 24, at 14–15.  
 100. NCSC, MISSOURI MUNICIPAL COURTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 15.  
 101. Id. at 14–15. The NCSC report findings are discussed in more detail infra at notes 
107–11 and accompanying text. 
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the appearance of integrity by prohibiting the “appearance of 
impropriety.” For the rule of law to operate, the public must have 
confidence in the judiciary, and public confidence depends upon 
judges behaving fairly, impartially, and without regard to their 
personal interests. Every entity that has examined the practice of part-
time municipal judges and prosecutors in Missouri, including the 
NCSC report commissioned by the Supreme Court of Missouri, has 
concluded that the lack of a clear prohibition for municipal judges to 
serve also as prosecutors and defense lawyers in other municipalities 
undermines public confidence in the judiciary. 
Given the findings of the NCSC, the DOJ investigation into the 
police and municipal court in Ferguson,
102
 the St. Louis Better 
Together report,
103
 and the broader findings of the ArchCity 
Defenders’ white paper on municipal courts throughout St. Louis 
County,
104
 there is reason for the public to lack confidence in the 
municipal court system. It is no surprise, then, that the Ferguson 
Commission’s own investigation also found that there is a lack of 
trust in the fairness and function of the municipal courts.
105
 The 
perceptions of conflicts of interest invited by the current practices 
undermine the legitimacy of the municipal courts and cause citizens 
to question whether justice is being consistently served. These doubts 
have grown as the municipalities employing lawyers as judges have 
become increasingly dependent on court fines and costs.
106
 
B. Solution 
To remedy these perceived conflicts of interest and lack of 
confidence in the part-time municipal court system, several different 
entities have recommended changes to the part-time judge system in 
municipal courts. The independent study for the Supreme Court of 
 
 102. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 24, at 4–5, 71–72, 75; see also Mann et al., 
supra note 3.  
 103. See PUBLIC SAFETY—MUNICIPAL COURTS, supra note 9; see also id. at 1. 
 104. See ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, supra note 25, at 1–2; see also DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, 
supra note 24, at 4–5.  
 105. FERGUSON COMM’N, supra, note 21, at 34.  
 106. See Maciag, supra note 42; PUBLIC SAFETY—MUNICIPAL COURTS, supra note 9, at 1–
2; MO. REV. STAT. § 479.120 (2015).  
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Missouri and the Office of States Courts Administrator, prepared by 
the NCSC,
107
 recommends that there be “strong, formal conflict of 
interest rules for municipal judges.”108 This recommendation is based 
on the fact that lawyers serving as prosecutors and judges at the same 
time “create situations where reasonable people often raise questions 
about the underlying incompatibility in those roles and a lawyer’s 
capacity to effectively separate them and serve impartially as a 
judge.”109 The report continues that “observations and interviews 
gave us the impression that some lawyers who are both municipal 
judges and municipal prosecutors do have difficulty effectively and 
ethically balancing those roles.”110 The study recommends that the 
Supreme Court of Missouri “consider a rule that prohibits lawyers 
who serve as municipal judges from simultaneously working as 
municipal prosecutors,” noting that some other states “commonly 
place formal restrictions on the ability of lawyers to serve in both 
functions.”111 
The Ferguson Commission’s recommendations concerning 
conflicts of interests of part-time judges serving as part-time 
prosecutors presaged the concerns in the study commissioned by the 
Supreme Court of Missouri released in November 2015. The key 
Ferguson Commission recommendation to prevent conflicts of 
interest among municipal judges is: “Municipal judges shall be 
prohibited from engaging in municipal court practice in the county in 
which they serve as municipal judges.”112 Explaining its concern and 
focus on conflicts of interest, the Commission noted the 
interconnections between lawyers serving as judges, prosecutors, and 
defense lawyers, and stated that “trust in the municipal court system 
is low, and fairness of the municipal courts is in doubt, the 
perceptions of conflicts of interest invited by the current practices 
undermines the legitimacy of the municipal courts and causes citizens 
to question whether justice is being consistently served.”113 
 
 107. NCSC, MISSOURI MUNICIPAL COURTS REPORT, supra note 1, at ii.  
 108. Id. at 14. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 14–15. 
 111. Id. at 15. 
 112. FERGUSON COMM’N, supra note 21, at 34. 
 113. Id. 
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I agree with underlying rationale for these recommendations, and 
I believe that the Supreme Court of Missouri should revise the 
Missouri Code of Judicial Conduct to be more similar to other 
jurisdictions that limit part-time judges’ practice of law. By placing 
reasonable restrictions on municipal judges’ outside law practice, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri would promote public trust and ensure 
that municipal court judges avoid the appearance of impropriety and 
possible conflicts of interest. Other state high courts have imposed 
such restrictions, and the different models are useful to consider.
114
 
For example, the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct provides that 
a part-time judge “shall not practice law in the court on which the 
judge serves or in any comparable level court in the same judicial 
district on which the judge serves or in any court subject to the 
appellate jurisdiction of the court on which the judge serves.”115 Such 
a restriction in Missouri would still permit a part-time municipal 
judge to hold multiple judgeships within the same judicial circuit and 
practice at the associate and district court levels within the same 
judicial circuit, as well as practice law at all levels in other judicial 
circuits, in state courts of appeals, the state high court, engage in 
transactional law practice such as contracts and trusts and estates, and 
practice law in federal court.  
New York takes another approach, and its rule states that a part-
time judge “shall not practice law in the court on which the judge 
serves, or any other court in the county in which his or her court is 
 
 114. The NCSC report notes that: 
Many states require all judicial positions to be full-time and bar judges from practicing 
law. Some, like Georgia and New Jersey, prohibit part-time judges from serving as 
prosecutors in any matters, and others, like Utah and Arizona, ban part-time judges or 
judges pro-tem from appearing as attorneys in any types of cases they preside over as 
judges.  
NCSC, MISSOURI MUNICIPAL COURTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 14.  
 115. COLO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, App. III (2010), https://www.courts.state.co.us/ 
userfiles/file/code_of_judicial_conduct.pdf (“Part-Time Judges”). Colorado has sixty-four 
counties and only twenty-two judicial districts, and some judicial districts in less populated 
areas encompass two to seven counties. Courts by District, COLO. JUDICIAL BRANCH (JAN. 27, 
2015), https://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/District/Choose.cfm. Similar to Colorado, 
Missouri has 114 counties and 22 judicial circuits, with judicial circuits in less populated areas 
encompassing two to five counties. Circuit Courts of Missouri, YOUR MO. COURTS (JAN. 27, 
2015), https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=321. 
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located.”116 Such a restriction in Missouri would permit a part-time 
municipal judge to hold multiple judgeships within the same judicial 
circuit, as well as practice law at all levels in other judicial circuits, in 
state courts of appeals, the state high court, engage in transactional 
law practice such as contracts and trusts and estates, and practice law 
in federal court. It would be more restrictive than Colorado’s rule in 
that a part-time municipal court judge would be prohibited from 
practice at the associate and district court levels of same judicial 
circuit as the judge’s municipal court if the judicial circuit was 
located in the same county where the lawyer served as a judge. 
Both the Colorado and New York approaches have something to 
offer Missouri. In a more densely populated area where a judicial 
circuit consists of one county, such as the 21st Judicial Circuit 
consisting of St. Louis County,
117
 the Colorado approach would 
appear to be less restrictive. Under such a rule, a part-time municipal 
court judge in St. Louis County would not be able to practice law in 
the other approximately eighty municipal courts in the county as a 
prosecutor or defense lawyer, but could continue practicing lawyer at 
all other court levels within the circuit. In contrast, in a less densely 
populated area, such as the 42nd Judicial Circuit that consists of five 
counties,
118
 a part-time municipal court judge would be prohibited 
from practicing in any other municipal court in a much larger 
geographical circuit with five times as many counties as the 21st 
Judicial Circuit even though the 42nd Judicial Circuit contains fewer 
municipal courts.
119
 
The New York approach, which prohibits practice in any court in 
the county in which a judge’s court is located, would be more 
restrictive in a more densely populated area such as St. Louis County, 
where the associate and district courts for the judicial circuit are 
located. In contrast, such an approach would be less restrictive in 
 
 116. 22 NYCRR 100.6(B)(2) (2006).  
 117. 21st Judicial District, YOUR MO. COURTS (Jan. 27 2015), https://www.courts.mo.gov/ 
page.jsp?id=1908. 
 118. 42nd Judicial Circuit, YOUR MO. COURTS (Jan. 27 2015), https://www.courts.mo. 
gov/page.jsp?id=1926.  
 119. The 42nd Judicial Circuit covers a large areas consisting of five counties, the most 
counties of any single circuit in Missouri, and there are fifteen active municipal courts in the 
circuit. Id. 
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thinly populated areas, especially if the municipal judge’s court is not 
located in the same county as the judicial circuit court. For example, 
Crawford County is part of the 42nd Judicial Circuit and the associate 
and circuit courts are located Reynolds County.
120
 There are only 
three municipal courts in Crawford County, and under a New York 
type approach a part-time judge in one of those municipal courts 
would be free to practice in the associate and district level courts. 
In order to strike a balance between the approaches in states such 
as Colorado and New York, I recommend that the Supreme Court of 
Missouri exercise its authority to amend the Missouri Code of 
Judicial Conduct to impose a reasonable restriction on a part-time 
municipal judge’s private law practice that would prohibit a judge 
from practicing law in any municipal court located in the same 
county in which the judge’s court is located. At present, the Missouri 
Code of Judicial Conduct states that a part-time municipal judge 
“shall not . . . practice law in the municipal division of the circuit 
court on which the judge serves.”121 By expanding the prohibition to 
include all municipal courts within the county in which the lawyer is 
a municipal judge, the Supreme Court of Missouri would provide 
attorneys serving as part-time judge clear guidance. The amended 
rule could be worded to say that a part-time municipal judge “shall 
not . . . practice law in any municipal court within the same county in 
which the judge serves.”  
Such a change would affect part-time municipal judges’ outside 
law practice as either municipal prosecutors or defense lawyers, but it 
would be a least-restrictive measure to prevent the appearance of 
impropriety and perceived conflicts of interest. This change would 
curb the public perception that some municipal judges capitalize on 
their judicial office to generate business as defense lawyers in other 
municipalities within the same county. This change would also be 
less restrictive than what is common in other states that permit part-
time judges, which provide that “part-time municipal judges could 
have a felony, family or civil law practice, but not a municipal law 
practice.”122 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. MO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2 Application, III(B)(1) (2012). 
 122. NCSC, MISSOURI MUNICIPAL COURTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 15 n.19. 
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Such a change is also consistent with the expectation, expressed in 
the Missouri Code of Judicial Conduct that: “A judge should expect 
to be the subject of public scrutiny that might be viewed as 
burdensome if applied to other citizens, and must accept the 
restrictions imposed by the code.”123 Every judicial position, 
including that of a part-time judge, comes with prestige and 
responsibilities. Chief among the responsibilities is the obligation to 
promote public confidence in the judiciary, which includes not using 
the prestige of judicial to advance personal interests as well as 
avoiding the appearance of impropriety that a part-time judge is 
doing so. The Supreme Court of Missouri can take a major step 
toward showing the general public that the court takes this 
responsibility seriously by imposing restrictions on part-time judges 
prosecuting and defending citizens in the same county in which they 
are expected to be fair and impartial. 
IV. ETHICS OF PROSECUTORS SERVING AS DEFENSE LAWYERS IN 
MUNICIPAL COURTS 
A. Problem 
Is it permissible for a prosecutor in City A to be the defense 
lawyer for defendant who lives in City A and was arrested in City B 
for DUI in violation of City B’s ordinance as the defendant drove out 
of City A onto the roads of City B? Do existing conflict of interest 
rules for prosecutors provide sufficient guidance to a part-time 
municipal prosecutor asked to defend such a defendant in another 
municipality within the same county? If not, is more guidance 
needed? 
It is helpful at the outset to note that that the existing conflict of 
interest rules do not specifically address conflicts of interest for 
prosecutors. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
124
 upon 
 
 123. MO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2-1.2, cmt. [2] (2012). 
 124. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2015) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. The ABA 
adopted the Model Rules in 1983, and they replaced the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility, which the ABA adopted in 1969. STEPHEN GILLERS ET AL., REGULATION OF 
LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 4 (2013). 
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which Missouri and other states model their lawyer ethics rules,
125
 
contains only one ethics rule directed to prosecutors entitled “Special 
Responsibilities of a Prosecutor.”126 This rule, Model Rule 3.8, does 
not even mention prosecutorial conflict of interest. Neither Missouri 
nor any other state has enacted an ethics conflict of interest rule 
specifically for prosecutors. As a result, Model Rule 1.7, the conflict 
of interest rule generally applicable to all lawyers, governs conflict of 
interest for prosecutors.  
Missouri’s conflict of interest rule, Missouri Rule 4-1.7(a)(2), 
tracks the Model Rule and states that a conflict of interest exists when 
“there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more 
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to 
another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal 
interest of the lawyer.”127 Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of the 
Law Governing Lawyers, which also provides guidance to lawyers, 
does not have a conflict of interest provision specifically dealing with 
prosecutors. Like the Model Rules and state rules, the Restatement 
has a general risk rule applicable to all lawyers, including 
prosecutors. Restatement Section 121 defines a conflict of interest as 
occurring whenever there is a “substantial risk” that the lawyer’s 
representation of a client will be “materially and adversely affected 
by the lawyer’s own interests or by the lawyer’s duties to another 
current client, a former client, or a third person.”128 A substantial risk 
is defined as “more than a mere possibility,” but need not be 
“immediate, actual, and apparent.”129 The Restatement explains that 
there must be a “significant and plausible” risk of adverse effect on 
the representation of the client.
130
  
 
 125. Today, all the states, except California, and the District of Columbia have adopted the 
number system and most of the language in the Model Rules. GILLERS ET AL., supra note 124, 
at 3.  
 126. MODEL RULES, R. 3.8. 
 127. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.7(a)(2) (2007) (emphasis added) [hereinafter MO. RULES OF 
PROF. CONDUCT]. 
 128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 (emphasis added). 
 129. Id. § 121 cmt. [c(iii)]. 
 130. Id. 
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The ABA Criminal Justice Standards are another source of 
guidance to prosecutors.
131
 Among the various types of conflicts of 
interest prohibited are any conflict with respect to a prosecutor’s 
“official duties,”132 and “permit[ting] his or her professional 
judgment or obligations to be affected by his or her own political, 
financial, business, property, or personal interests.”133  
Thus, both the Model Rules and the Restatement focus on the risk 
that various incentives may adversely affect a lawyer’s representation 
of his or her client. While the Criminal Justice Standards do not 
expressly state that the focus is on risk, they both elevate the 
prosecutor’s official duties above personal interests and caution a 
prosecutor not to let personal interests, including financial interests, 
affect his or her professional judgment or obligations. In sum, all of 
these authorities emphasize that a prosecutor, including those who are 
part-time, must be primarily dedicated to his or her official 
obligations and avoid the risk that other considerations, such as the 
financial incentives to switch sides to become defense counsel, will 
undermine their professional judgment and underlying official duties 
as a prosecutor. 
For some part-time prosecutors at the county level who enforce 
state laws, clear guidance does exist in the form of advisory ethics 
opinions and some state statutes that explicitly state that a prosecutor 
may not defend in criminal cases in his or her own county and 
elsewhere in the state.
134
 Some states have extended this ban to 
prohibit a county prosecutor from defense practice in federal court 
and, in some states, even defense practice in another state.
135
 The 
rationale for the ban on defense work within the state is that a 
prosecutor who represents the state should not take a position 
contrary to the state due to the duty of loyalty to the state as a client. 
 
 131. Standard 3-1.1 explains the function of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards, in 
pertinent part, as follows: “These standards are intended to be used as a guide to professional 
conduct and performance.” ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEF. 
FUNCTION Standard 3-1.1 (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS]. 
 132. Standard 3-1.3(a) states: “A prosecutor should avoid a conflict of interest with respect 
to his or her official duties.” Id. 
 133. Id. at Standard 3-1.3(f). 
 134. Underwood, supra note 15, at 37–38.  
 135. Id. at 38. 
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The more expansive bans on a part-time county prosecutor 
representing criminal defendants in federal court or in another state’s 
courts “are usually justified in terms of ‘appearances,’ or on the 
ground that a defense role might interfere with the ability or 
willingness of other police forces and prosecutors to cooperate with 
the switch-hitter in other cases.”136 
The National District Attorneys Association has taken a similar 
hardline stance by issuing a standard expressly prohibiting a 
prosecutor from simultaneously being a defense attorney. In the 
National Prosecution Standards, the organization states that in 
jurisdictions that do not prohibit private practice by a prosecutor: 
“The prosecutor in his private practice should not represent clients in 
any criminal or quasi-criminal related matters, regardless of the 
jurisdiction where the case is pending.”137 The National Prosecution 
Standards also prohibit indicating one’s status as a prosecutor in 
advertising or any communications about one’s private practice,138 
which would also preclude a part-time prosecutor from listing his or 
her status on a firm website to attract business, as some do in St. 
Louis County.
139
 The rationale for such strong prohibitions appear 
grounded in the view that a prosecutor, even a part-time prosecutor, 
is not an advocate like other lawyers and should put the best interests 
of society first at all times.
140
  
Turning back to the hypothetical of a prosecutor for City A 
switching roles to become the defense lawyer for a defendant arrested 
of DUI in adjacent City B, let us analyze the prosecutor’s obligations 
to City A and the risks of switching sides to be a defense lawyer in 
City B. The prosecutor is obligated to represent the interests of City 
A, which includes the residents of City A. This obligation includes 
promoting public safety, by enforcing the laws and seeking sanctions 
 
 136. Id. at 40–41. 
 137. NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS Standard 1-
3.2(a) (3d ed. 2009) [hereinafter NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS]. 
 138. Id. at Standard 1-3.2(c) (“The prosecutor should not indicate his or her status as a 
prosecutor on any letterhead, announcement advertising, or other communication involved in 
the private practice. . . .”).  
 139. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text. 
 140. Commentary to the prosecutor’s responsibilities emphasize the prosecutor’s 
overarching obligation to the best interests of society. NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, 
supra note 137, at Standard 1 cmt.  
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against those who drive dangerously. Does switching sides to become 
a defense lawyer in City B undermine this obligation? In the role of a 
defense lawyer, the lawyer’s obligation is to seek the defendant’s 
objectives, which include keeping the defendant’s ability to drive. 
Even if the defendant is a repeat offender, as a defense attorney the 
lawyer who is also a prosecutor is obligated to seek dismissal or 
reduction of the charges if there is a legal basis to do so.
141
 In such a 
situation, some of the citizens in City A would likely believe that 
their prosecutor is not protecting them from drunken drivers.  
This is exactly what a resident of St. Ann, Missouri, said when the 
prosecutor for St. Ann became the defense lawyer for another St. Ann 
resident who was arrested in the neighboring city of St. John, 
Missouri.
142
 After switching roles to become a defense lawyer, the 
part-time prosecutor filed a motion to stay the suspension of his 
client’s license, and obtained a series of continuances for nearly a 
year delaying any possible punishment for his client and enabling his 
client to continue to drive with a valid license.
143
 The resident said: 
“It makes me feel unsafe. And I don’t think it’s a good thing for my 
community to have. I know they’re [drunken drivers] out there, but I 
just don’t understand why the prosecuting attorney would represent 
him.”144 
Under the ethics rules and other authorities, such as the 
Restatement and the Criminal Justice Standards, a part-time 
municipal prosecutor should not switch sides to become a defense 
lawyer when there is significant and substantial risk of impairment to 
the prosecutor’s ability to represent the municipality’s interests, and 
there is no good reason for taking this risk. In the hypothetical and 
 
 141. This is exactly the position that the prosecutor in Chesterfield, Missouri, took in 
explaining that he saw nothing wrong with the municipal judge in Chesterfield serving as the 
defense lawyer for a defendant charged with “Driving Under the Influence” in adjacent Town 
and Country, Missouri. A news report stated that he said “‘it’s natural for an attorney to take on 
roles that seem contrary. He also represents people accused of driving drunk. Each day and each 
court appearance presents a different case with a different set of facts and relevant law,’ he said. 
‘When I am hired by a client, my job is to listen to what the issue is, give advice and 
recommendations, and then follow their instructions.’” Kohler & Deere, supra note 92. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. The complaining resident “is a member of Mothers Against Drunk Driving who 
says her daughter was injured by a drunken driver in 1998.” Id. 
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real life situations explained above, the risk of impairment to the 
prosecutor’s ability to represent a municipality’s interests is 
substantial. By switching from prosecutor to defense lawyer for a 
person charged with a DUI, the prosecutor is obligated as a defense 
lawyer to help that person keep his license and continue to drive. At 
the same time, the lawyer prosecuting the driver is obligated to 
promote public safety by trying to suspend the person’s license and 
keep him off of the road for some period of time. Although this type 
of conflict in switching roles is not expressly prohibited by Missouri 
Rules of Professional Conduct, there seems to be no justification for a 
prosecutor to engage in such activity. 
Here the only justification for a prosecutor to switch roles to be a 
defense lawyer in other municipal courts in the same county appears 
to be a prosecutor’s self-interest in having no restrictions on his or 
her practice that might limit potential income from practicing in other 
municipal courts as a defense attorney. Another arguable justification 
may be that if there was such a restriction there could be a dearth of 
qualified lawyers willing to forego potentially lucrative municipal 
defense practice in the same county by becoming part-time 
prosecutors. But, that has not been shown in other jurisdictions. 
For example, more than fifteen years ago the New Jersey Supreme 
Court enacted a court rule that expressly prohibits a lawyer from 
simultaneously serving as a prosecutor and defense counsel in the 
same county. In 2000, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled on a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel lodged against a defense 
lawyer who had represented a defendant in the Superior Court for 
Middlesex County, while he was a part-time municipal prosecutor in 
New Brunswick, also located in Middlesex County.
145
 The defendant 
argued that he did not know of the lawyer’s employment as a 
prosecutor and that his lawyer’s role as a prosecutor created a conflict 
that deprived the defendant of effective assistance of counsel.
146
 The 
court determined that because there was no rule or law prohibiting 
the defendant’s lawyer from simultaneously serving as a municipal 
prosecutor and representing the defendant in the Superior Court of 
the same county there was no actual conflict or prejudice to the 
 
 145. State v. Clark, 744 A.2d 109, 110 (N.J. 2000). 
 146. Id. 
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defendant.
147
 The case, though, prompted the court to consider the 
issue, and it determined that a court rule that prohibited a municipal 
prosecutor from representing a defendant in the municipal court in 
which the lawyer was a prosecutor should be amended “to preclude a 
municipal prosecutor from simultaneously serving as a defense 
counsel in the same county in which he or she serves as municipal 
prosecutor.”148 The court then proceeded to amend New Jersey Court 
Rule 1:15-3(b) to state, in pertinent part: 
A municipal prosecutor shall not represent a defendant in any 
other municipal court in that county or in a criminal 
proceeding in the Superior Court in that county but may 
represent a defendant in a municipal court or in a criminal 
proceeding in the Superior Court in a county other than the one 
in which he or she serves as a municipal prosecutor.
149
 
In stating why such a rule was required, the court explained: “The 
dual role strikes at the integrity of the criminal justice system because 
it epitomizes how a prosecutor’s impartiality can be undermined.”150 
The court determined that confining the prohibition of dual roles to 
the same county in which the municipal prosecutor serves was 
sufficient and that a statewide ban was not necessary.
151
 
In reaching its decision to amend the rule, the court also 
acknowledged that it may lead to resignations by some municipal 
prosecutors, but the policy reasons for such a rule far outweighed that 
consideration.
152
 Predictions of mass resignations proved to be 
unfounded.
153
 While some did resign, most municipal prosecutors 
 
 147. Id. at 110–11. 
 148. Id. at 112. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 111–12. The Court reasoned that without such a rule a municipal prosecutor 
might be in the position of relying on a police officer one day and the next day be in the 
position of cross-examining the same officer or his or her partner in Superior Court. Id. at 111 
(“Dual representation in the same county therefore presents a significant possibility of conflict 
that could impair a defendant’s right to a fair trial, including effective assistance of counsel, 
while at the same time creating prosecutorial partiality.”).  
 151. Id. at 112. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Mark Hansen, Weathering the Fallout: N.J. Prosecutors Adjust to Court Decision 
Barring Defense Work, 87 A.B.A. J. 24 (2001).   
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continued to hold onto their positions.
154
 As one prosecutor remarked, 
“[t]here doesn’t seem to be any shortage of people willing to do the 
job.”155 
B. Solution 
As the present situation in Missouri—and especially in St. Louis 
County—demonstrates, municipal prosecutors do not always 
appreciate the potential conflict of interest presented when also 
serving as defense lawyers within the same county. While current 
ethics rules provide the basis for a prosecutor in such a situation to 
decline to represent potential clients in other municipal courts within 
the same county, this does not appear to be the norm. Instead, some 
lawyers promote their role as municipal prosecutors on their websites 
to help generate business as defense counsel in other municipal courts 
in the same county.
156
 Municipal prosecutors need more guidance on 
this matter, and there are at least two possible approaches for the 
Supreme Court of Missouri to provide that guidance: a change to the 
ethics rules or a change to the court rules for municipal courts. 
One possible approach would be to add a new section to Missouri 
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4-3.8 prohibiting a municipal 
prosecutor from representing a defendant in any other municipal 
court in the same county in which he or she is a prosecutor. Or, 
language addressing this conflict could be added to the comments to 
Rule 4-1.7. Comment [8] to Rule 4-1.7, for example, addresses 
conflicts where there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s ability to 
represent a client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer’s 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. (quoting John Dangler, immediate-past president of the County Prosecutors 
Association of New Jersey). 
 156. See supra notes 9–13 and accompanying text. In most states that have part-time 
prosecutors, a municipal prosecutor may be a defense counsel outside of the city in which he or 
she is a prosecutor provided that the case does not involve the police or violation of ordinances 
of the prosecutor’s city. Underwood, supra note 15, at 41–42. Missouri had advisory ethics to 
this effect. MO. BAR INFORMAL OP. 20000200 (2000) (stating that a part-time municipal 
prosecutor may defend in other municipalities provide no law enforcement officers from the 
municipality where the lawyer is a prosecutor are involved).  
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other responsibilities or interests.
157
 An additional sentence could be 
added to the end of this comment to state: “A municipal prosecutor 
shall not represent a defendant in any other municipal court in the 
same county in which he or she is a prosecutor.” 
Another approach, which I believe is preferable to changing the 
ethics rules, is for the Supreme Court of Missouri to exercise its 
power under the Missouri State Constitution to create a new court 
rule to address this matter.
158
 Rule 37 of Missouri Supreme Court 
Rules and Court Operating Rules concerns statutory and ordinance 
violations and violation bureaus, which include municipal courts.
159
 
Rule 37.01 states: “Rule 37 governs the procedure in all courts of this 
state having original jurisdiction of ordinance violations and the 
disposition of any such violation in a violation bureau.”160 At present, 
Rule 37.12 is reserved, which means that section of Rule 37 is 
 
 157. The comment states:  
Even where there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of interest exists if there is a 
significant risk that a lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend, or carry out an 
appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the 
lawyer’s other responsibilities or interests. For example, a lawyer asked to represent 
several individuals seeking to form a joint venture is likely to be materially limited in 
the lawyer’s ability to recommend or advocate all possible positions that each might 
take because of the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to the others. The conflict in effect 
forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. The mere 
possibility of subsequent harm does not itself require disclosure and consent. The 
critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if it 
does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer’s independent professional 
judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably 
should be pursued on behalf of the client. 
MO. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 4-1.7, cmt. [8] (2007).  
 158. The Missouri Constitution states: 
The supreme court may establish rules relating to practice, procedure and pleading for 
all courts and administrative tribunals, which shall have the force and effect of law. 
The rules shall not change substantive rights, or the law relating to evidence, the oral 
examination of witnesses, juries, the right of trial by jury, or the right of appeal. The 
court shall publish the rules and fix the day on which they take effect, but no rule shall 
take effect before six months after its publication. Any rule may be annulled or 
amended in whole or in part by a law limited to the purpose.  
MO. CONST. art. V, § 5.  
 159. MO. SUP. CT. R. 37 (2004), http://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=831.  
 160. MO. SUP. CT. R. 37.01 (2004), http://www.courts.mo.gov/courts/ClerkHandbooks 
P2RulesOnly.nsf/c0c6ffa99df4993f86256ba50057dcb8/2821b2ba9f82ec4386256ebe0070d8de?
OpenDocument.  
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available for possible future rule adoption. I recommend that the 
Supreme Court of Missouri adopt the following Rule 37.12: “A 
municipal prosecutor shall not represent a defendant in any other 
municipal court in the same county in which he or she is a 
prosecutor.” 
One advantage of a court rule is that it would specifically address 
lawyers practicing law in municipal courts. The number of lawyers 
serving as municipal prosecutors in Missouri is relatively small 
compared to all of the lawyers licensed to practice law in Missouri, 
and a court rule change targeted at municipal court practice appears 
to be the better solution to this problem than amending the ethics 
rules. This is also consistent with how other state high courts, such as 
New Jersey, have addressed this issue. At the same time that the 
Supreme Court of Missouri should consider such a rule, it could also 
consider whether it would be appropriate to prohibit a municipal 
prosecutor not only from representing a defendant in a municipal 
court but also in the associate or circuit court in the same a county in 
which he or she serves as a municipal prosecutor, as the New Jersey 
Supreme Court rule did. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The current ethics rules applicable to part-time judges and 
prosecutors in Missouri and some other states lack specific 
prohibitions on lawyers simultaneously serving as judges, 
prosecutors, and defense lawyers in municipal courts in the same 
county. In the absence of express language prohibiting the practice, 
several lawyers have adopted these multiple roles in St. Louis County 
municipal court system, which has been described as “the ultimate 
good old boys club” where “[f]avors are traded behind the scenes 
between lawyers who frequently appear before one another.”161 The 
longer such a system exists, the greater the erosion of public 
confidence in the justice system will be. The appropriate body to 
address these issues is the Supreme Court of Missouri, which has the 
authority and responsibility to regulate the conduct of judges and 
 
 161. See Mann et al., supra note 3. 
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lawyers.
162
 The appropriate person to monitor municipal judges is the 
presiding judge of the circuit who has “general administrative 
authority over the judges and court personnel of all divisions of the 
circuit court hearing and determining ordinance violations within the 
circuit.”163  
This Article sets forth reasonable recommendations that would 
prevent a part-time municipal judge from serving as a prosecutor or 
defense lawyer in other municipal courts in the same county,
164
 and 
would prevent a part-time municipal prosecutor from representing a 
defendant in any other municipal court in the same county in which 
he or she is a prosecutor.
165
 These are straightforward and easy to 
adopt measures. These measures are calculated to help municipal 
judges avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, as well 
as help municipal judges and prosecutors avoid potential and actual 
conflicts of interest. Most of all, these measures would help to build 
public confidence that all courts, including municipal courts, are 
focused on doing justice. As Justice Frankfurter stated, “justice must 
satisfy the appearance of justice.”166 If the Supreme Court of 
Missouri acts to set higher standards of ethics among lawyers in 
municipal courts, the court will take a major step toward satisfying 
the appearance of justice and a major step forward toward justice 
itself. 
 
 162. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 163. See MO. SUP. CT. R. 37.04 (2004), http://www.courts.mo.gov/courts/ClerkHandbooks 
P2RulesOnly.nsf/c0c6ffa99df4993f86256ba50057dcb8/c5e2c9785009eaff86256ca6005212d1?
OpenDocument.  
 164. See supra Part III. 
 165. See supra Part IV. 
 166. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S. Ct. 11, 13 (1954).  
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